RAINBOW SPRINGS FIRE
INCIDENT COMMANDER NARRATION
Given February 1997 for use in the Fatality Fire Case Study Training Course
Lessons Learned
In the months that followed, I spent many hours reliving the fire
mostly from midnight to 6:00 A.M. in the morning. There was never any difficulty
coming up with ways that disaster could have been prevented.
Interviews conducted during the investigation revealed that most of the firefighters,
including overhead people, were very much unaware of the actual danger prior
to the tragic accident. I would seriously question anyone who would say the
blow-up, especially the intensity of that blow-up should have been predicted.
The majority of vegetation at the blow-up site was green black-jack oak which
is not considered an explosive fuel. However, with my fire experience in similar
terrain with similar weather conditions, I knew most anything was possible
but I failed to convey that understanding to the people on the line. I consider
that to be by far the most serious mistake I made during the course of the
afternoon. I was foolish enough to think my plan would keep them out of harms
way. The problem was, I seemed to be the only one that understood the plan.
The lesson to any IC in a similar situation is that nothing can be substituted
for a very detailed briefing prior to commencing action. It is especially
important to provide a chain of communications that provides some assurance
the plan is understood by all.
While a good initial attack plan that is well understood is an important
first step, it will not ensure safety. Conditions can change very rapidly
when dealing with extreme fire weather. That is why fireline safety so often
comes down to people on the ground. Individual performance is always critical
and I do not believe that was understood by many of the people that participated
in the Rainbow Springs Incident. The attitude demonstrated by some of our
people during initial attack seemed to reflect the same attitude that had
been given to fire readiness over the past several years.
In the months that followed, I spent many hours reliving the fire mostly
from midnight to 6:00 A.M. in the morning. There was never any difficulty
coming up with ways that disaster could have been prevented.
Interviews conducted during the investigation revealed that most of the firefighters,
including overhead people, were very much unaware of the actual danger prior
to the tragic accident. I would seriously question anyone who would say the
blow-up, especially the intensity of that blow-up should have been predicted.
The majority of vegetation at the blow-up site was green black-jack oak which
is not considered an explosive fuel. However, with my fire experience in similar
terrain with similar weather conditions, I knew most anything was possible
but I failed to convey that understanding to the people on the line. I consider
that to be by far the most serious mistake I made during the course of the
afternoon. I was foolish enough to think my plan would keep them out of harms
way. The problem was, I seemed to be the only one that understood the plan.
The lesson to any IC in a similar situation is that nothing can be substituted
for a very detailed briefing prior to commencing action. It is especially
important to provide a chain of communications that provides some assurance
the plan is understood by all.
While a good initial attack plan that is well understood is an important
first step, it will not ensure safety. Conditions can change very rapidly
when dealing with extreme fire weather. That is why fireline safety so often
comes down to people on the ground. Individual performance is always critical
and I do not believe that was understood by many of the people that participated
in the Rainbow Springs Incident. The attitude demonstrated by some of our
people during initial attack seemed to reflect the same attitude that had
been given to fire readiness over the past several years.
I will provide some examples of performance that kept this fire from being
remembered as just another fire and probably forgotten by now. Perhaps someone
can learn from these examples and see that they are not repeated at another
time and place.
The tractor line that was constructed up the mountain to the blow-up site
was mostly located on the east side of the north-south ridge. That meant burn-out
would involve firing downhill from the line into a very strong wind. The mountain
was too steep for the tractor to construct a line moving forward up slope.
Instead, the tractor operator would back up the mountain a short distance
and build the line back down. Perhaps that contributed to the line being extremely
crooked with some very sharp turns. In my opinion, there is no chance the
line would have held had the burn-out been attempted.
The proper location for the tractor line would have been a straight line
on the west side of that same ridge near Point D. That would have provided
mostly uphill firing in which the fire would have moved rapidly away from
the line. There would have been a reasonable chance of holding a line at that
location during burn-out, but more importantly, the condition of vegetation
following the blow-up revealed the likelihood that the tractor crew would
have survived had they been on that side of the ridge.
Another missed opportunity for safety was not having a drip torch or any
other firing device at the critical time it was needed. Had the burn out been
started as soon as I directed it be done, that operation would have started
at the blow-up site. The fuels in that area would have had over an hour to
burn out. A reburn was very unlikely since the fire traveled entirely on the
surface until reaching the blow-up site.
Yet another example of a missed opportunity for safety was the failure of
a large number of people (some very experienced) to notice the imminent danger
when travelling the tractor line by foot just minutes before the blow-up.
The fire at Point C had almost reached the tractor line when they used it
for foot travel to reach the top of Dallas Mountain. As discussed earlier,
a very large portion of that line running up the mountain through the blow-up
site was dangerously located either inside or immediately outside of the canyon
that was a classical chimney. Since most of those people travelling the line
were dispatched from other districts, they probably trusted that we would
provide for their safety and were not looking for safety hazards. This is
an excellent example of the need for each individual to be concerned for his/her
safety at all times while on the fireline. As mentioned earlier, many of those
people escaped death by only a matter of 15 to 20 minutes.
Perhaps there are dozens of other examples of what we should have done differently,
but I have probably dwelled on that to much already. What I really wanted
to emphasize is our lack of preparation and how that relates to the above
examples.
As far as the tractor line being located in the wrong place, that was simply
the lack of knowledge and experience although one person involved in locating
it had nearly 30 years experience with the Forest Service. Firefighting knowledge
and firefighting experience can sometimes have a weak relationship if the
person involved is not interested in fire. Some of us may find fire duty unpleasant
but we could pay a terrible price if we do not endeavor to learn as much as
we can about fireline safety.
We did not have enough wildfires on the Mena District to gain needed experience
and failed to look for other opportunities. What if more of our people had
been given major responsibilities in planning and implementing prescribed
burns? That would have been a good opportunity to learn how to properly locate
control lines and develop other valuable firefighting techniques. We had a
prescribed burning program but did not take advantage of the training opportunities
it could have provided. I might also mention that we did not encourage participation
in off forest fire details. Since we had very few fires at our home unit,
those details could have provided valuable firefighting experience. However,
one must approach those off forest details with the intention of learning
as much as possible. It should not be just a case of adventure and a fat paycheck.
We usually learn a lot more if we take on responsibilities that exceed our
comfort level.
The case of the drip torch not being on the tractor is perhaps the most revealing
example of our lack of preparation and the very low priority given to fire
management.
Several weeks before the spring fire season of 1984 officially ended, a decision
was made to mount a boom-jet sprayer on our tractor to perform silvicultural
work. That rendered the tractor almost useless for initial attack. Perhaps
it was a stroke of luck that the silvicultural work was completed around mid
April without any problems. On April 24, 1984, one day prior to the tragic
fire, a group of temporary employees under the supervision of the TSI and
Reforestation Forester removed the sprayer from the tractor. I was later informed
that the drip torch was removed from the tractor during that operation and
no one bother to put it back. As discussed earlier, just simply having the
drip torch on the tractor at that most critical time when it was needed would
have likely saved two lives. Had we been conducting annual fire training on
the district and talking fire on a fairly regular basis, perhaps one of those
employees would have known the importance of the drip torch being on the tractor.
I talked earlier about low morale and the overall mental condition of our
people. We will never know how much that affected our performance on April
25, 1984 but there is a great likelihood that it did have some negative
effects. That should be another heads up when having to place people into
initial attack
situations during extreme fire weather.
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