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April 13-15, 2007
Salida, Colorado
Anderson Ranch Fire — August, 1997
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Communicating Intent and Imparting Presence
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Communicating Intent
and
Imparting Presence
Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence G Shattuck, U.S. Army
“Intent = Purpose
+ Method + Endstate.”
“ Intent should
have five elements.”
“ It should have two elements.”
“ It’s
Aftragstaktik made simple for the masses.”
“ It should be a
structured process.”
“ It should be informal.”
THESE STATEMENTS about commander’s intent, some of them obviously
contradictory, were collected a few years ago from Combined Arms and
Services Staff School (CAS3) students and Army War College (AWC) students—all
combat arms officers. Their understanding of commander’s intent
clearly demonstrates that although the concept of intent has been in
our doctrine for quite a while, confusion still exists. Yet, there has
been little empirical investigation into the process of communicating
intent. After a brief review of what Army doctrine and other literature
have to say about intent, this article will present the sobering findings
of one study that investigated the communication of intent in four active-duty
combat arms battalions. Next, the article will propose a method to help
commanders improve their ability to communicate intent to their subordinates.
Finally, the article will argue that the process of communicating intent
is subordinate to another process known as imparting presence.
Commander’s Intent
in Doctrine and Practice
Although US Army commanders have long used intent to guide the actions
of subordinates, it has only recently been formally included in doctrine.
Commander’s intent first appeared in US Army Field Manual (FM)
100-5, Operations, in 1982.1 During the 1970s, the military tended
to centralize decision making. Events such as the failed hostage rescue
mission in Iran signaled the need to empower subordinate commanders
on the scene. Army doctrine writers used the German army’s Aftragstaktik,
first introduced in the early 19th century, as a model for today’s
concept of commander’s intent.
If the enemy commander
has 10 possible courses of action, but the friendly commander, restricted
by the senior commander, has only one course of
action available, the enemy clearly has the advantage. But, if the friendly
force’s senior commander, through a minimally constraining intent
statement, empowers his subordinates, they can adapt to any situation
they confront.
Aftragstaktik, best translated as mission-oriented command, was developed
in response to the French revolution and “Napoleon’s method
of waging war, which swept away the traditional armies and their linear
tactics, iron discipline, blind obedience and intolerance of independent
action.”2 According to J.L. Silva, Aftragstaktik was not a set
of procedures but a philosophy, a social norm within the German army.
At its foundation was the realization that “battle is marked by
confusion and ambiguity.” The German army leaders “consciously
traded assurance of control for assurance of self-induced action.” These
leaders developed a military cultural norm that supported and expected
decisive action by subordinates in the face of uncertainty or ambiguity.
Fundamental to the success of Aftragstaktik in the German doctrine was
trust. Silva writes:
“Trust between superior and subordinate is the cornerstone of
mission-oriented command. The superior trusts his subordinate to exercise
his judgment and creativity, to act as the situation dictates to reach
the maximum goal articulated in his mission; the subordinate trusts that
whatever action he takes in good faith to contribute to the good of the
whole will be supported by his superior.”3
Silva indicates that such confidence in subordinates stems from the
superior’s intimate personal knowledge of each one. German senior
commanders knew that such knowledge was essential to implementing Aftragstaktik.
In formalizing Aftragstaktik into US Army doctrine, the fullness of
the concept was diluted. The 1993 version of FM 100-5 defines commander’s
intent, but there is no discussion of social norms, expectations, trust
or intimate personal knowledge of subordinates. Instead, FM 100-5 focuses
on structure and content rather than process.
“The commander’s intent describes the desired endstate.
It is a concise statement of the purpose of the operation and must be
understood two levels below the level of the issuing commander. It must
clearly state the purpose of the mission. It is the single unifying focus
for all subordinate elements. It is not a summary of the concept of the
operation. Its purpose is to focus subordinates on what has to be accomplished
in order to achieve success, even when the plan and concept no longer
apply, and to discipline their efforts toward that end.
The intent statement is usually written but can be verbal when time
is short. It should be concise and clear; long narrative descriptions
of how the commander sees the fight tend to inhibit the initiative of
the subordinates.”4
Intent in practice. Gary Klein’s study of intent statements and
preliminary investigations indicated that intent statements often do
not comply with doctrine’s content and structural guidance. Klein
collected 97 intent statements for analysis and found that their lengths
ranged from 21 to 484 words, with most of them averaging between 76 and
200 words.5 Here is an intent statement written by a brigade commander
deployed to the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California.
“The purpose of X Brigade.s operation is to protect the Corps,
rear and build-up of follow-on friendly forces. In support of Division
and Corps, we must attack rapidly to the west in the Central Corridor,
destroy the lead motorized rifle battalion (MRB) of the XXX Motorized
Rifle Regiment (MRR) between Phase Line (PL) IMPERIAL and PL EXCALIBUR,
and then seize defensible terrain along PL EXCALIBUR. To do this, X-X
Infantry (Light) will infiltrate to secure Hill 780 (NK4411), deny the
enemy its use, and block to the west to prevent the enemy’s use
of the mobility corridor between Hill 780 and the south wall of the Central
Corridor (Avenue of Approach 3). Task Force X-XX, the brigade
main effort, will move to contact in zone, fix the advance guard main
body (AGMB)
and destroy it with an enveloping attack in depth. Brigade deep artillery
fires, close air support and scatterable mines
will be designed to attrit its commitment into the Brigade zone, and
force the AGMB into the southern avenue of approach, where TF X-XX can
destroy it by direct fires. After destruction of the MRB in zone, TF X-XX will continue the attack to seize defensible terrain along
PL EXCALIBUR. End state visualized is lead MRB of XXX MRR destroyed; brigade with heavy
forces in control of Brown and Debman passes; and brigade postured to
conduct defensive operations to destroy follow-on enemy regiments.”6
This brigade commander took pride in his clear, doctrinal intent statements.
Unfortunately, in this case, he missed the mark. The italicized portion that dominates
this long intent statement is method. It tells each subordinate unit
what
to do, and the detail limits the flexibility of subordinate commanders
for if they fail to accomplish the tasks listed, they fail to achieve
their commander’s intent.
J.L. Silva, Aftragstaktik was
not a set of procedures but a philosophy, a social norm within the
German
army. At its foundation was the realization
that “battle is marked by confusion and ambiguity.” The
German army leaders “consciously traded assurance of control
for assurance of self-induced action.”
In an operation order briefing held later during this same brigade’s
NTC rotation, a battalion commander asked for clarification of his unit’s
mission. The brigade commander, somewhat frustrated, said, “OK,
you want your brigade commander’s priority? Take care of this.
If you don’t get this right then TF X-XX will not be able to get
through.” The brigade commander’s response was, arguably,
a much clearer intent statement than the written form that he had spent
so much time crafting.
Flexibility versus synchronization. The difference between the brigade
commander’s written and verbal intent statements highlights the
tension between the constructs of centralization and flexibility. The
senior commander must make an inherent tradeoff which impacts the subordinate
commander’s ability to adapt to battlefield conditions. The battlefield
is a highly complex, uncertain environment where a commander matches
wits with his opponent while coping with such variables as terrain, weather,
morale, fatigue and equipment. Providing subordinate commanders a large
degree of flexibility is critical to success. Consider the following
illustration. If both the enemy and friendly commanders have only one
course of action
available to them, parity exists. If, however, the enemy commander has
10 possible courses of action, but the friendly commander, restricted
by the senior commander, still has only one course of action available,
the enemy clearly has the advantage. But, if the friendly force’s
senior commander, through a minimally constraining intent statement,
empowers his subordinates, they can adapt to any battlefield situation
they confront.
A battalion
commander asked for clarification of his unit’s mission.
The brigade commander, somewhat frustrated, said, “OK,
you want your brigade commander’s priority? Take care
of this. If you don’t
get this right then TF X-XX will
not be able to get through.” His oral response was, arguably,
a much clearer intent statement than the written
form that he had spent so much time crafting.
Senior commanders must not lose the ability to synchronize events as
they provide flexibility to subordinate commanders. A commander who does
not synchronize subordinate efforts invites disaster. During Israel’s
1956 Sinai Campaign General Moshe Dayan stated:
“To the commander of an Israeli unit, I can point on a map to
the Suez Canal and say: ‘There’s your target and this is
your axis of advance. Don’t signal me during the fighting for more
men, arms, or vehicles. All that we could allocate you’ve already
got, and there isn’t anymore. Keep signaling your advances. You
must reach the Suez in 48 hours.’”7
These orders all but eliminated Dean’s ability to influence the
battle. On one occasion, an entire brigade watched while two other brigades
were fighting to capture an objective. In retrospect, Dayan realized
his mistake. He wrote that the heavy emphasis on improvisation and flexibility
and the absence of a strong controlling hand meant that “our capacity
for misadventure [was] limitless.” And, granted “a huge measure
of independence,” the brigade commanders failed to coordinate their
movements.8 When senior commanders provide their subordinates with flexibility
at the expense of synchronization, battlefield activities are coordinated
only by coincidence.
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